THE New Republic

Four Senators Who Would Be President

Pages 7-9

The Berlin Controversy

What Are We Prepared To Defend?

By JAMES E. KING, JR.

Novels and the News . . . . . *Delmore Schwartz*

Barbara Ward's World . . . . *Daniel Friedenberg*

Man on the Make . . . . . *Stanley Kauffmann*

A Raisin in the Sun . . . . . *Tom F. Driver*

NATO After Ten Years . . . *Washington Wire*

APRIL 13, 1959

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Washington Wire

The Good Old Days

NATO MET HERE again in Washington —10 years later—but with no bounce. This reporter watched NATO formed 10 years ago in the same ornate Federal Auditorium. Same vast ornate gilded structure, same blue stucco ceiling five stories up, same military music, same huge fluted columns, same searchlights boring through the railway station gloom. . . . Cast of characters new and costumes slightly altered: not a single pair of striped pants in the lot (though every ornamental male sported a pocket handkerchief).

The big difference was that 10 years ago the free world was going places, the United States was an international blood bank of ideas—the very creation of NATO showed dash and imagination. Russia was a bad boy, and we were doing something about it. We had the answers in those days. Acheson's bristling moustache, Robert Schuman's eloquence, Bevin's shredded aspirates, yes, and little Truman's fox-terrier irrepressibility. As he hauled Vice President Barkley up on the stage—brown business suit among frock coats—that was the easy, confident, cheery self-assurance of those days.

What's happened? Well, instead of our having the initiative Moscow has it. The assemblage here last week had the sense of a defensive, basically negative, holding operation. The flowers garlanded on the front of the temporary stage were a bit like those on a bier. Voices were determined, all right; nobody was quaking; there was an admirable quiet resolution on all sides—but it was the atmosphere of soldiers awaiting a charge, not of soldiers about to charge.

And there was the difference between Truman and Eisenhower, wrapped up perhaps in this curious quality of bounce. Eisenhower's welcoming address, you understand, wasn't at all bad; it was good and gray and lofty. He is always the High Priest. We would not wish to be unfair; surely Eisenhower has the right to stress "spiritual values," and no Eisenhower speech on the subject would be complete without a reference to the Soviets' "atheistic materialism." God, it appears, is on our side. Yet other leaders seem to make less of it.

Come to think of it, there was another difference. Ten years ago one nation had the bomb; today three have it with a fourth, France, coming up. And 10 years hence they will sell bombs at hardware shops. Troubles—? Wait 10 years till Bulgaria, Burma and Bolivia have their own bombs.

We thought Eisenhower's speech last Saturday at Gettysburg on foreign aid was excellent. If anything we would back more economic aid. Truman indorsed it too. It will be the most shortsighted folly if Congressional Democrats make common cause with GOP isolationists to weaken this program.

As we reported in this column last week, Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson gave the brush-off to the 17 newly elected Democrats who voted for a more generous unemployment relief bill, while Johnson went off to Texas. As might have been expected, their anger found expression in an open letter to Johnson by Michigan's liberal Senator Pat McNamara. It is a much more serious blow to Johnson's prestige than Proxmire's earlier attack because McNamara speaks for a cohesive group.

The Blind Hero

WHAT WE cannot understand is Johnson's obtuseness to the situation he is in. He is sitting on a volcano. The November election was a great liberal triumph. Yet Johnson acts as though nothing had happened. Johnson is an able man, though not the superman represented by some of the press which likes to build up (and tear down) heroes. Yet he does not seem to sense the frustration engendered among Northern Democrats by the revival of the old Dixiecrat-GOP alliance. Johnson has refused to join the National Advisory Council set up by Paul Butler's Democratic headquarters to give the party a national voice. He has seemed to feel he could run his own one-man Congressional party, without caucuses and with only the approval of his precious Policy Committee which is recruited from 8 small population states.

Meanwhile conservatives in some Southern states, whose members tend to dominate Congressional committees through seniority chairmanships, are organizing for 1960. They threaten to bolt the party if dissatisfied with the candidate. Six states, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina, with 59 electoral votes, are reportedly so organized.

Washington sees this week the big AFL-CIO rally against unemployment. One of the main points of attack will be, of course, the tragically inadequate emergency bill to extend the Federal program. It was to strengthen this bill that McNamara, in behalf of 17 other Senators, vainly appealed to Johnson. The majority leader has been asked to address the rally; if he does it will be a curious confrontation.

Notes

POST-NATO CONFERENCE views heard here: The situation moves towards a continuation of the present armed truce, with minor modifications of the status quo; Khrushchev realizes he went too far in his six months Berlin ultimatum; (hopefully) there will be no war. . . . Almost nobody seems to think Dulles will be back. . . . With only about 18 months to serve, Eisenhower is promoting subordinates to fill Administration vacancies in a "make-do" operation. . . . A cozy $100-a-plate private dinner to Sen. Everett Dirksen here, attended by industrialists, gives the GOP leader a nice kitty for Illinois propaganda. . . . Washington holds its breath over the current Wall Street speculative spree fed by Administration scare warnings against "inflation"; there's a feeling a break will come sometime this year. . . . Without the aid of Sherman Adams and Dulles, Eisenhower has been working harder than at any time since his operation; attendants feel he needs his present Georgia vacation. . . . Incidentally, a deficit now seems certain for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, Eisenhower's sixth in seven years.

T.R.B.

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Correspondence

► *Plain, Downright Mean*

SIRS:

A GOOD PART of what is wrong with the South is Dr. Freud. Had it not been for him we would not have the relays of amateur psychoanalysts pawing our psyches, prying into our anxieties, resentments and guilts. . . . Mr.

(Continued on page 23)

"Most Useless Bore"

THERE IS no disputing the President's words to the Gettysburg College spring convocation last week that "the future of our country depends upon enlightened leadership, upon the truly educated—understanding—citizen." All of us are for education (though not, in Mr. Eisenhower's case, for federal aid to education—not this year). All we need is wider agreement on what education is for. And here one must turn from the politician to the philosopher.

When Alfred North Whitehead wrote about American education 30 years ago this week in *The New Republic*, 12 out of every 100 young people between 18 and 21 were attending school; today the figure is 35. Twenty-nine out of every hundred 17-year-olds graduated from high school that year; 65 out of every hundred will do so in 1959. And where in 1929, 122,500 B.A. degrees were earned—or rather given—the expected number 30 years later is 365,700.

But this extension of educational coverage was foreseen in 1929, as was our contemporary commitment to responsibility for educating "the whole child." Television may not have been imagined, but a variety of new teaching devices were anticipated, as was the demand for more and better instruction in the sciences.

It is when we come to Whitehead's statement of the deepest purposes of education that we are most struck by the insignificance of changes brought by time and circumstance. It seemed to him then (and how much more evident it is now) that the devil in the scholastic world had "assumed the form of a general education consisting of scraps of a large number of disconnected subjects; and, with the artfulness of the serpent [the devil] has entrenched himself behind the entrance examinations of the universities." Scraps of information, Whitehead wrote, have nothing to do with culture and "a merely well-informed man is the most useless bore on God's earth," impervious to "activity of thought, and receptiveness to beauty, and humane feeling."

Why is it that schools of education, once alive with the ferment of genius, become pedantic and lifeless? Because, in Whitehead's view:

> they are overladen with inert ideas. . . . That is the reason why uneducated clever women, who have seen much of the world, are in middle life so much the more cultured part of the community. They have been saved from this horrible burden of inert ideas. Every intellectual revolution which has ever stirred humanity into greatness has been a passionate protest against inert ideas.

For Whitehead, the claims of the "insistent present" are supreme. And to classicists who sneer at education which is "useful," he asks: "But if education is not useful, what is it? Is it a talent, to be hidden away in a napkin?"

The nation is richer in textbooks than ever before. But whenever a textbook is written that has real educational worth, a reviewer can still be found

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who claims "it will be difficult to teach from it." Of course it will be difficult:

> If it were easy, the book ought to be burned; for it cannot be education. . . . The evil path is represented by a book or a set of lectures which will practically enable the student to learn by heart all the questions likely to be asked at the next . . . examination.

No, Whitehead concluded, impressing disconnected facts or ideas on the brain is not education—however many degrees are bestowed across the land—for the only subject matter of education is "Life in all its manifestations." It is not:

> Algebra, from which nothing follows. . . . Science, from which nothing follows; a couple of languages never mastered; and lastly, most dreary of all, Literature, represented by plays of Shakespeare with philological notes and short analyses of plot and character to be in substance committed to memory.

Such a list cannot represent Life, and the best that can be said of it is that,

> it is a rapid table of contents which a deity might run over in his mind while he was thinking of creating a world, and had not yet determined how to put it together.

Do You Swear?

SENATOR KENNEDY hopes to turn the clock back. We wish him well. He has introduced a bill (co-sponsored by Sen. Joseph S. Clark) to repeal the provision of the National Defense Education Act which requires any holder of a federal college scholarship to sign a loyalty oath and an affidavit certifying he does not believe in, belong to, or support any subversive organization. Sen. Kennedy suggests we be concerned,

> as to whether this unnecessary, futile gesture toward the memory of an earlier age will not defeat the very purposes of last year's bill. . . . Those who are willing to sign such an affidavit are not always by that act necessarily proven to be either more loyal or more talented than those who do not sign.

A "futile" gesture because the test of loyalty, as of character, is action.

Over the past decade, more and more faith has been placed in oath-taking and affidavit-filing as guarantors of security. A 1958 survey by the American Federation of Teachers showed that only 17 of the 48 states require no loyalty pledges from their teachers. (Senator Kennedy's home-state applies the oath requirement to private as well as public school teachers.) A National Education Association study of three years ago revealed that 16 states (including Alaska and Hawaii) require their teachers to swear they will refrain from joining any subversive group. In Mississippi, every public school instructor must file an affidavit listing the names and addresses of all associations to which they have belonged during the last five years and to which they pay dues or contribute. Each Rhode Island teacher must acknowledge under oath that he has,

> no right, either in school hours, or in the presence of my pupils out of school hours, to express opinions that conflict with honor to country, loyalty to American ideals, and obedience to and respect for the laws of Nation and State.

Texas teachers must say whether they have belonged to any group on the Attorney General's list during the past five years, and if so give the circumstances of their joining. (To obtain a license, pharmacists in Texas must also take a loyalty oath.)

If you wish to join the American Bar Association, you must first state whether you have ever been a member of the Communist Party; one-third of the states ask bar applicants under oath to answer direct loyalty questions. Alaska, Colorado, Kentucky, Oklahoma and the state of Washington require prospective lawyers to swear they are not and "never have been" advocates of overthrowing the government by force. (One Washington, D.C., lawyer who went to Hawaii to try a case recently was obliged to pledge he would not try to overturn the Hawaiian government during his 5-day stay.)

To participate in Civil Defense in Oklahoma one must testify that he does not,

> advocate by the medium of teaching, or justify, directly or indirectly, and am not a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party or the Cominform or with any party or organization, political or otherwise, known to me to advocate by the medium of teaching, or justify, directly or indirectly, revolution, sedition, treason or a program of sabotage, or the overthrow of the government of the United States or of the state of Oklahoma or a change in the form of government thereof by force, violence, or other unlawful means.

Absurdities abound. Employees of the state of Georgia promise to "refrain from directly or indirectly subscribing to or teaching any theory of government, of economic or social relations which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of patriotism and high ideals of Americanism." The District of Columbia Insurance Commission asks would-be insurance salesmen each year whether they are now or ever have been members of any group cited by the Attorney General, or whether they have ever claimed a constitutional privilege when questioned. And, so far as we know, the Indiana Athletic Commission stands by its ruling that no boxer or wrestler may fight in Indiana who does not disavow any subversive affiliation.

If Senator Kennedy is able to knock the oath provision out of the federal scholarship program, it can be taken as a sign of returning sanity in these matters. Yet

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the fantasies "of an earlier age" have been so long accepted by so many as real, we suspect, that Rep. Graham A. Barden (D, N.C.) speaks in the authentic accent of *vox populi* when he says he has been swearing allegiance since Boy Scout days, and it hasn't hurt him a bit.

Enforcing Desegregation

WE TOOK exception (*NR*, March 30) to the implication of neutrality in Sen. Lyndon Johnson's proposal that the facilities of a federal mediation service be extended to communities where peaceful relations are endangered by disagreements about the Constitution of the United States. As our support of the Douglas-Celler bill, expressed at the same time, alone sufficiently demonstrates, this does not mean that we believe the Supreme Court's desegregation order presents just a problem in law enforcement. On the contrary, we have repeatedly said that in this instance the law is not simply "the law," to be enforced by command and coercion like a traffic regulation. We have expressed the opinion that ultimately the validity of the Court's integration decision "is a function of its rightness, not merely of its pronouncement." Hence, as Mr. Thorson rightly said in our correspondence columns last week, "the techniques of ethics and politics . . . reasoned persuasion" are not only admissible; they are indispensable.

But—and this is of the first importance—conciliation and persuasion can come into play only before the issuance, or within the terms, of a court decree. There can be no negotiation about obeying a specific decree that says admit these named children to this school, or produce a plan by a certain date, or the like. To a command of this sort, resistance is insupportable. For such, as Lincoln saw in opposing the *Dred Scott* case, "are the uses of decisions of courts." The Johnson proposal is ambiguous on this point.

Secondly, no effort at suasion and conciliation can be fruitful unless it begins by expressing the firm support of the other branches of the federal government for the basic moral principle of the Court's integration decision; unless, that is (and Lincoln also saw this distinction clearly), Congress and the President support that decision not merely as, for the time being, "the law," but as a wise and just and permanent "political rule." Of this there is no hint in the Johnson proposal.

Retreat in Virginia

THE VIRGINIA legislature is now debating a plan to formalize Governor Lindsay Almond's capitulation to the Supreme Court on school desegregation last February. After two months' study, a 40-man commission of legislators appointed to draft a long-range response to desegregation rulings has recommended "freedom of choice" for local communities to run desegregated schools or to rely instead on segregated private schools subsidized by pupil scholarships from the state.

Compared to the "massive resistance" laws which closed nine Virginia schools last year, the new legislation the Perrow Commission contemplates would be a marked advance: districts which want to operate desegregated schools could do so without hindrance from the state and Virginia could finally be counted among the states recognizing *in principle* the right to equal education regardless of race.

But the tuition grant or "scholarship" system which is the heart of the Perrow plan could not stand unchallenged for long. As Lieutenant-Governor A. E. S. Stephens accurately remarked, the new plan only draws lines "for the next battle in a long, long war." A Court test would come as soon as there was evidence that although *all* pupils who prefer private, non-sectarian schools to public schools are eligible for state scholarships, the scholarship plan was being used in practice to evade the Supreme Court's intent in its 1954 decision. Sectarian schools, specifically excluded from the plan, might contest the constitutionality of such a system on that ground alone. And others could question the entirely new state service being created in an attempt to make tuition grants constitutional: providing scholarship aid to students who have been in private schools all along would add nearly $2.5 million a year to Virginia's strained budget.

Rockefeller's First Test

THE LAST THREE months in New York State have proved that Nelson Rockefeller is a good deal more than a glamorous television personality, whose attractive smile and appealing promises defeated a more wooden rival who held approximately the same opinions on most issues. The post-election image placed before the eyes of the voters is that of the politician who used the momentum of his victory to force upon his own party a fiscal reform which few of its members relished. The quarter of a billion dollar increase in state taxes, coupled with the long overdue introduction of a withholding system, promise to place state finances on a sound basis for some years to come. Since an increase in taxes was essential, Rockefeller acted wisely in asking for enough.

In pushing his program through the legislature, the Governor used the classic weapons of the modern political leader: he delayed appointments to desirable jobs, he spoke directly to his constituents on television, and he accepted gracefully some amendments to his proposals, including a larger tax credit for married couples, and the restoration of capital gains levies on 1958 profits. With

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a touch of pleasant irony, he congratulated the legislature, after this performance, upon its political courage.

In order to achieve this much, the Governor had to give up something. What he sacrificed, after the dreary fashion of Republican Governors of the state, was the fiscal interests of New York City. Originally proposing $15 million of additional state aid to the city, he acceded to the legislature's slash to $5 million. He accepted also as a condition of some financial support to the city colleges, Senator Mahoney's requirement that these colleges accept out-of-city students—a provision that may cost the city more than it gains in state aid. There is little question that Mr. Rockefeller wanted to do something for the city, of which he is himself a leading resident. But it is equally true that in the end the city's interests took second place to other objectives.

It may be that Mr. Rockefeller got as much as was possible at this session. Rent control was extended without demur, additional funds were made available for middle income housing, and a promising transit program was passed. These achievements, in addition to fiscal reform, much exceed the run of legislative performance. The question is, can the Governor keep it up? As opposition in his antediluvian legislature hardens, can he make progress toward remedying some of the inequities of state-city relations, extending legislation against discrimination in housing and employment, and adding to the state's structure of social legislation. If he can advance on these three fronts, he will prove not only an excellent Governor but a formidable Presidential candidate.

Tut, Tut, Mr. Young!

SENATOR STEPHEN M. YOUNG (D, Ohio) is undoubtedly a traitor to his class. Having been assigned to the Senate Agricultural and Aeronautical-Space Committees he immediately offered for sale his holdings in two sugar companies and one airline. He did so because as a member of these committees he will probably have to pass on bills affecting sugar and air transportation; he is not going to have it said that he uses his vote to put money in his own pocket. So he is selling out although, at least as regards his sugar holdings, he will have to take a loss.

All agree that if it comes to a choice between taking a loss or going to jail it is a Senator's duty to take a loss; but this man puts a possible indictment by public opinion on a level with possible indictment by a grand jury. That raises the ethical standard of the Senate to a level that some of Senator Young's colleagues will find embarrassing. They will not thank the Senator from Ohio. If he continues that course he is likely to find himself about as popular in the Senate as a Cardinal at a Ku Klux Konvention.

Selassie to Moscow

HAILE SELASSIE, it has just been announced, will visit Mr. Khrushchev this summer. The initiative for the invitation is believed to have come from Ethiopia and suggests that the Emperor does not wish to seem a puppet of the West just because he has accepted its money. Although Moscovites must by now be used to strange visitors, an Emperor who has been described by *Pravda* not as the Lion of Judah but as the shakal of American imperialism will be an oddity of a special sort. Diligent readers of *Pravda* may remember that Selassie's confidential advisor on foreign affairs is a Midwestern lawyer, John Spencer. Then there are those ICA gifts and World Bank loans, not to mention American control of the Ethiopian highway administration, operation of the Ethiopian Airlines as a subsidiary of TWA, and the US military telecommunications base in Ethiopian Eritrea.

It was not always thus. At the end of the last century, a short-lived Russian colony in Ethiopia was established by Pan-Slav enthusiasts who hoped to attach the Monophysite Ethiopian Church to the Russian Orthodox. Somewhat later, the present Emperor's father received a gift of two million rounds of ammunition from the Czar —intended to frighten the Italians and the British. And since World War II, the Soviets have taken considerable interest in the area: If they could get a foothold on the edge of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, they would not have done badly.

Ethiopians have developed a dexterity in balancing opposing influences. Haile Selassie encourages his young airline clerks to visit Moscow; Tito has been feted; and while large contracts have been negotiated with Germany, the Ethiopian-Yugoslav Trading Company runs the largest department store in Addis Ababa, and Yugoslav engineers building the port at Assab nicely counterbalance Italians who work on the hydroelectric project on the Awash river.

The Emperor at that moment is concerned at Ethiopia's encirclement by strident Islam. Since its accord with the Sudan, Egypt has gained some influence over an additional thousand miles of the White Nile and naturally will cast a longing eye over the Ethiopian parts of the Blue Nile and the head waters of Lake Tana. Radio Cairo is calling on the Moslem half of Ethiopia to stir itself, and there is immediate danger that the Ethiopian Somalis (one-third of the Ethiopian Empire) will press too hard for unification of all the Somalis—this being Cairo's wish but not Selassie's.

It should not be thought that the Emperor's trip to Moscow will be a loss for the West; it could, on the contrary, take some of the curse off too close US identification with the two old, too American-influenced and slightly demodé African countries—Ethiopia and Liberia. It would be an error also for the Russians to draw too

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comforting a conclusion from the visit. Gibbon's last words in Book IV of *The Decline and Fall* have not yet come to pass:

> The Monophysite churches resounded with a song of triumph that the sheep of Ethiopia were now delivered from the hyenas of the West, and the gates of that solitary realm were forever shut against the arts, the sciences and the fanaticism of the West.

Robertson Resigns

WALTER S. ROBERTSON is resigning as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs because of failing health. The China policy with which he has been identified is failing too. Mr. Robertson's role has been significant precisely because, in the absence of other equally strong and coherent views within the Administration on how to confront and contain Chinese power, the influence of one who knew what he wanted could prevail. Robertson's successor, J. Graham Parsons, is a respected career officer who has not noticeably dissented from the pro-Chiang Robertson line, but who is a diplomatic "technician" and perhaps therefore less likely to confuse facts with wishes.

One issue on which known disagreement has existed between Mr. Robertson and some others concerned with China policy is that of disengagement from the offshore islands. Robertson has uncritically accepted Chiang's claim that the Nationalist cause would be seriously endangered by the psychological shock of any military withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu. The practical consequence of this subservience to Chiang has been a partial surrender by our government of control over its own Asian policy in the interest of bolstering the KMT regime. Robertson's friendship with Chiang was counted an asset; since it was believed he could restrain the Generalissimo when restraint was in the US interest. But has this been the case? Robertson and Admiral Radford were dispatched to Formosa to dissuade Chiang from garrisoning the offshore islands early in 1955 and failed to do so. And when Chiang last October agreed that he would repudiate the use of force as the "main" means of regaining control of the mainland, he was responding, informed sources say, to prodding by Mr. Dulles only reluctantly supported, if at all, by Mr. Robertson.

Mr. Robertson's exit, while it does not promise any radical revision in policy, provides the opportunity for review. The State Department need no longer, for example, take it on Chiang's word that Taipeh will collapse the day we disengage from the offshore islands. It might now also be possible to give some unemotional consideration to admitting Communist China to United Nations membership. The Tibetan dispatches thus far have been between New Delhi and Peking. But that, in part, is because there is no wider forum in which the Chinese Communists could be called to account.

THE DEMOCRATIC SENATORS

Four Who Would Be President

SOME OF THE Democratic elite on Capitol Hill are devoting odd moments to a refresher course in ancient history—going as far back as 1932. Subject: how Franklin Roosevelt made off with his first Presidential nomination in spite of the coalition "gang up" against him. Authors: Jim Farley and H. L. Mencken (not always remembered as demon reporter of national conventions for the *Baltimore Sun* for more than 30 years). Their Message to would-be nominees: It's not so much who you are as what you do. Whether that is true for a TV-age has yet to be tested.

"A national convention," Mencken condescendingly explains at the beginning of his uproarious account of the 1932 conventions (*Making a President*), "is so constituted that the candidate who avoids all dangerous talk and confines himself quietly to rounding up delegates has an enormous advantage."

> Nine-tenths of these delegates are professional politicians; hence they are but little interested in so-called issues; the one thing that really fetches them is the promise of jobs. Some of them come from constituencies which have no votes—the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands and so on. The rest, though they represent enfranchised states, are apportioned in an irrational and even insane manner. . . . The result is that a convention is made up in large part of delegates who represent, not voters, but simply politicians. The wise candidate goes after these politicians very early, and knows how to persuade them. This was done by Lord Hoover before 1928, and by Dr. Roosevelt beginning a year ago.

The four US Senators seriously studying the possibilities of capturing the nomination for themselves in 1960 —Kennedy, Humphrey, Symington and Johnson—all grasp this simple truth. On the "how" of applying it, there are differences. Senator Kennedy last year chose the road Jim Farley took in 1930. "Two main courses directly opposed to each other were possible," Farley records in his political autobiography, *Behind the Ballots*.

> We could sit back and conduct what might be called a passive campaign—that is, limit ourselves to making friendly contacts and the issuance of press releases extolling the Roosevelt qualities. That would avoid the risk of antagonizing "favorite-son" candidates until the time was ripe for the big push. Or we could turn on the pressure immediately, openly disclosing our objective, and set about the job of rounding up enough

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delegates to make nomination a certainty. We chose the latter course, although its hazards were self-evident.

Senator Kennedy apparently judges his nerves to be strong enough for this kind of dangerous living too, and Senator Humphrey has never yet let fear of landing in the ditch deter him from speeding ahead as fast as his legs could take him. For Senators Symington and Johnson, however, circumstances dictate the "passive campaign." If Symington joined in an open contest for delegates, it would quickly become apparent that he is not a national candidate in the sense of having active support in all parts of the country; outside the lower Midwest and scattered areas elsewhere he is not well known. The illogic of a Johnson candidacy at this time is so clear that to reveal a romantic ambition by openly seeking delegates would, as he knows, diminish the Majority Leader's stature.

Symington and Johnson are, therefore, condemned to the frustrating course of "sitting back" which Farley described, "making friendly contacts and issuing press releases until the time is ripe for the big push"—if it ever is. But they are not foreclosed, any more than Kennedy and Humphrey, from laying the firm foundations of knowledge and contacts basic to professional operation during a nominating convention. "The amount of work involved in such a program is stupendous," Jim Farley writes, with seeming weariness even in retrospect. "But national politics is big business, and we set about the task [in 1932] of mastering every detail that would have a bearing on the nomination of a Presidential candidate. In the end this mastery of detail was a primary cause in bringing about the nomination of our candidate at Chicago." It can be primary again in Los Angeles in 1960.

"MASTERY of detail" is, however, the icing on a cake which should first contain generous layers of strategy, money and organizing brains. Strategy all four Senators have. In today's advertising language this calls first of all for a pleasing "national image." Kennedy thinks he's got it, and the polls—if remotely accurate—bear him out. The other three Senators are out to get it, and rate themselves at differing degrees of remoteness from the goal. Humphrey's friends want to sharpen up the picture of him as the man with the energy and dedication to recapture the American initiative in world affairs, and if possible bring peace closer; they also think his "poor boy" background will evoke sympathetic identification with the average man. Symington's coaches want to rumple the country club appearance their candidate makes by more interest in subjects like agriculture—which has made new friends for him recently. Johnson is only anxious that the *Time-Life* estimate ("all of his numerous friends and many of his numerous enemies agree that if the nominations were made on ability alone, he would be a walk-in") not be blurred by repetition of doubts like Senator Proxmire's and Senator McNamara's.

All four are shoring up the power blocs on which they hope to build. Kennedy starts with his family of New England state delegations and those elsewhere which supported him for Vice President against Kefauver in 1956. Humphrey counts on the upper Midwest farm states and scattered clusters of labor and liberal delegates. Symington, in addition to lower Midwest and Southern border support, attracts hard-headed, let's-not-take-chances party organization men looking for a candidate who offends the least number of voters. And Johnson counts on coming into the convention with a bloc of 200-300 Southern votes pledged to him, and which he may use as leverage.

To stand a chance all four must protect their bases at whatever cost; it is unlikely, therefore, that Lyndon Johnson will decide to advance himself by playing to Northern grandstands on any matter of keen Southern concern—or Hubert Humphrey vice-versa. But none of the contenders obviously can come within miles of winning on the strength of his power base alone.

As announced candidates, Kennedy and Humphrey will have another source of advance delegate power—the Presidential preference primaries—that Symington and Johnson's strategies will deny to them. These elections will produce fewer convention votes for the leaders than they did in 1952 and 1956, when Stevenson and Kefauver made the arduous primary circuit. This year a great number of states holding primaries have Democratic Governors who plan to enter their names as favorite sons, and both Kennedy and Humphrey will avoid opposing them on their home grounds. But after politely deferring to Governors Meyner, Williams, Brown, Chandler and perhaps Tawes and Lawrence as well, that will still leave New Hampshire, Florida, South Dakota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin and possibly Ohio for Humphrey and Kennedy to contest.

New Hampshire, which will hold the first primary next March 13, Humphrey will surely grant to Kennedy as home ground. (The Minnesota primary scheduled for the same day until the legislature abolished it last month could have been an offsetting victory for Humphrey.) Thus, the first primary test between the two "active" candidates is now expected to come in Wisconsin next April. Great publicity and significance will attach to it, and if Kennedy is the winner it will be hard for Humphrey to overtake him. But Nebraska, with similar farm-belt problems, will offer the loser in Wisconsin a chance to recoup in its May primary. Both Kennedy and Humphrey are weighing the value of including this test on their list. In Oregon on May 19 the two camps contemplate another collision. Candidates may be entered there without their permission, and friends or foes will surely oblige by filing both "active" contenders. The already fragmented Oregon Democratic Party should be atomized when the duel is over. Kennedy does not plan

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to contest for the delegates on June 5 from South Dakota, the state of Humphrey's birth.

So much for strategy.

As for money, none of the four will be seriously lacking—Kennedy has the most, Symington and Johnson plenty, Humphrey much less.

Organizing brains they are all reaching out to get. FDR's forces would not have entered Chicago in '32 with the "mastery of detail" they had except for Louis McHenry Howe and Jim Farley. Johnson has the least concern on this score. In addition to his own not inconsiderable capabilities, he is well supplied with professional staff and personal advisers of 20 years' proven worth and loyalty. The fact that his friend and former Majority Policy Committee counsel, James Rowe, Jr., has joined the Humphrey campaign does not cripple an organization in which Rowe's senior law partner, Thomas Corcoran, remains brain-truster-in-chief as he has been since Johnson came to Congress.

Kennedy, being so far in front, can take his time before expanding his organization for "Operation Detail," and much thought is going into it. Tentative ideas on how to proceed show imagination and daring. As of now the inclination is to keep the Kennedy campaign young and free and debonair—without benefit of old pros at the wheel. Thus far Kennedy's administrative assistant for his 6½ years in the Senate, Ted Sorensen of Nebraska, has successfully handled relations with state delegations (the Midwest Democratic Conference at Milwaukee in March, for example). Sorensen's personal integrity as a liberal and his being the offspring of generations of Norris Progressives does much to disarm critics looking for signs of money manipulation at the root of the Kennedy candidacy. And the calibre of similar young men being considered for supplementary spots in the Kennedy organization can add to that appearance.

There are, of course, more mature operators also working for Kennedy—many of them of common religious faith with the Massachusetts Senator, which is neither surprising nor sinister since so large a part of the Democratic Party hierarchy is Roman Catholic. Catholics hold top party posts today in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Wisconsin, in addition to most of the New England states. That fact does not make it any harder for Senator Kennedy to communicate with leading delegates-to-be in all those places

The younger Humphrey organization has not crystallized. Some of his zealous supporters were at first troubled by the selection of Senator Johnson's friend and Mr. Corcoran's law partner as manager of the campaign for fear that this signalled some studied retreat from liberalism. But Mr. Rowe has stated that he favors no change in the character of the Humphrey approach, and those who know the Senator are aware that it would do Rowe no good if he did. The thought in bringing Mr. Rowe into the Humphrey circle was of what he might contribute from his experience as an FDR aide, and as deputy director of the 1956 Stevenson campaign.

To supplement and balance Mr. Rowe, the Humphrey campaign has taken on James Loeb, one of the founders of ADA and a former Harriman associate, as scout and delegate hunter; he is already roaming the West. Soon to be added is James Lanigan, now a business associate of wealthy Democratic angel Roger Stevens, who served Truman in the White House and worked for Truman's candidate, Averell Harriman in 1956. Continuing as chief staff aide on political as well as legislative matters will be Herbert Waters, whose long experience in farm affairs will be valuable in building a Midwest Humphrey bloc. And always near Humphrey is his former assistant, Washington lawyer Max Kampelman.

Symington's circle is more mature, consisting as it does primarily of Truman intimates. Clark Clifford, White House counsel in Truman days, acts as unofficial coordinator from his Washington law office. Harry Truman himself serves as chairman-of-the-board-in-charge-of-rounding-up-old-pros-to-round-up-delegates-for-Symington. Determined not to repeat his 1956 error of trying to nominate Harriman single-handedly, Truman is said to have recruited Frank McKinney and Frank McHale of Indiana, Jake More of Iowa, Jake Arvey of Illinois, Ed Pauley of California, and to have a pledge of support under certain circumstances from Speaker Rayburn himself. Symington, of course, can count on others to abet his cause: contemporaries from his days as a business executive, experienced campaigners like Sen. George Smathers (who has special influence as chairman for 1960 of the Senate Democratic Campaign Committee) and corporation executive and former New Dealer James Allen.

THESE casts of characters will grow and change. The same people who perform well in corralling delegates may not be proficient at the higher art of "nailing them fast" or making sure that convention machinery grinds favorably—or at least fairly—with respect to their candidate.

Most of those in top positions in the leading races accept the Farley aphorism that "In politics it is well to take nothing for granted." And most of them will be prepared if the scene in Los Angeles next July resembles the one H. L. Mencken described from Chicago in 1932:

> When the delegates got to town on Sunday all the prospects seemed to run the other way. Roosevelt, it appeared, would be jammed through with scarcely a yell from anyone save Al Smith. But now it is plain that he will have to fight ferociously every inch of the way, and his maneuvers so far show that his victory is by no means certain. Thus the convention lines up for an old-time Democratic battle royal. The brethren sniff the scent of battle. The air will be full of hair and ears within 24 hours.

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The Berlin Controversy

What Are We Prepared To Defend?

by JAMES E. KING, JR.

FROM KHRUSHCHEV'S point of view, Berlin *is* a "cancer." For this island a hundred miles inside East Germany is a standing challenge to the alien power that maintains a Communist regime on German soil. West Berlin's freedom, and its insulting prosperity and *éclat*, attest the achievement of the West (including the West Germans) in rehabilitating the parts of Germany that lie beyond Russian control. But even if West Berlin were less successful, it was not to be expected that the Russians would be reconciled to the settlement which followed the Berlin blockade in 1949. Had not our government made it clear ever since 1946 that it regarded Western Europe's freedom from Communist domination as indispensable to the kind of world we can live in? This policy inevitably made Germany, historically the key to Europe, the main issue of conflict in the Cold War. And the evolution of divided Germany since World War II has made Berlin the key to Germany.

In 1949, Stalin felt he had to accept a temporary setback over Berlin. The basic reason was probably military. The airlift made Soviet ruthlessness look foolish, and that is something no great power can long abide. But the only alternative to retreat, once the contest had hardened into blockade and airlift, was war. From this alternative the Russians turned back. It is important to recognize, however, that it was the Western Allies who first turned aside from the risk of war by resorting to the airlift instead of pushing through to West Berlin with armed columns on the ground. Thus, while the Russians did not then achieve their objective, the West allowed Berlin to remain as a pawn to later Russian initiatives. Since it is generally believed that the Kremlin has now revived the Berlin issue because of changes in the military situation which offer the USSR opportunities that were not available in 1949, it is essential that we try to understand what these changes are.

It is a common over-simplification to explain the 1948-49 victory in the "battle of Berlin" by reference merely to the US monopoly of nuclear military power. In fact, both sides examined the prospect of World War III, and both were repelled by it. On balance, this was to the Russian disadvantage only because they had taken the initiative and were compelled to back down. What both sides saw in the crystal ball was a large-scale and protracted war, fought with conventional weapons and forces, with the US lead in strategic air power and the limited US stock of A-bombs serving to offset the Soviet advantage in ground forces. The Russians knew their massive advantage in ground forces would enable them to overrun Western Europe. But they also knew that unless they achieved air supremacy over Western Europe, which they could not count on doing, they would be unable to invade Britain. Meanwhile US strategic bombers, operating from British bases, would make new Hiroshimas of the cities of European Russia.

On the other hand, the Russians knew that the US strategic bombing capability was limited, and they may well have had reason to believe that their own A-bombs would have come along in time to offset much of our nuclear lead. (Remember, they did explode their first nuclear device in August, 1949.) What deterred the Russians in 1949, then, was almost certainly not the conviction that they would be unable to *win*, but the certainty that they could not win without at least a repetition of the destruction they had suffered at the hands of the Germans in World War II. And Stalin's Russia was in no condition to engage in another great war of attrition in 1948.

So the Berlin blockade was lifted and the territorial *status quo ante* was restored in Central Europe. A little over a year later, Stalin, perhaps carried away by the communization of mainland China, tried to pick up in Korea a piece of the "free world" he thought had been abandoned by the US. He probably counted upon achieving a *fait accompli* before we could move effectively even if we were inclined to try. But he selected the one place around the periphery of his Asian empire where we were in a position to move, feebly at first but eventually with great effect.

The primary lesson the Russians learned from the Korean War was that the US *would* use military force to defend its interests, though conflicts distant from the continental US might be limited in such a way that the Russian homeland itself need not be involved. A second

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lesson was not less important: the difficulty of predicting in advance what our own interpretation of our interests in any particular crisis was going to be, and consequently what resistance the Russians must be prepared for.

The Korean War, meanwhile, set in motion forces that were to alter the world military balance substantially, and hence the prospect of World War III. The first of these was the West's greatly increased military effort, particularly the general rearmament of the US. Included also were new military plans of the European members of NATO, who, shortly after the Korean armistice, succeeded in concerting programs that would have gone far toward redressing the East-West imbalance of conventional land forces in Europe. But the eye-catcher was the tremendous expansion of our own Strategic Air Command, particularly after H-bombs began to be available about 1954.

It was on this growing power of SAC that the Eisenhower Administration, to redeem its campaign promise of economy in defense, built its policy of deterrence, better known as "massive retaliation." SAC bombers (later supplemented by the Navy's carrier bombers and by the fighter bombers of the Tactical Air Command in Western Europe and elsewhere) were to give the US the capacity to respond to military aggression "vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing," without risk of effective counter-retaliation. This being the case, it seemed appropriate to warn the potential aggressor, "glutted with manpower" though he was, not to be "tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower," as the new Secretary of State said in January, 1954. The Secretary's meaning was clear: blessed by an overwhelming strength in strategic air power, the US did not need to be prepared to *defend* its interests locally, which might result in our again becoming engaged in a long and costly conflict such as the Korean War. Instead, we could threaten the aggressor with nuclear *punishment*, administered promptly, safely, and cheaply by air-power, and thereby *deter* him from adventures inimical to our interests.

It must be recognized that this was an entirely new concept of national defense. It was, in fact, hardly "defense" at all, because "defense" suggests being prepared to fight for our interests; it was "deterrence" in a very special new sense. It suggested that, given the means (nuclear air power) and the will to use the means, we did not have to be prepared to fight because any rational enemy would be prevented from attacking by his fear of our "capacity to inflict punishing damage," as Mr. Dulles put it.

In his original announcement of the new strategy, in January, 1954, the Secretary qualified its promise to some extent by saying: "If we can deter such aggression *as would mean general war*, and that is our confident resolve, then we can let time and fundamentals work for

The Communist Position

NOVEMBER 27, 1958—The Soviet Union asks that West Berlin be made "an independent political entity." If the "free city" proposal is rejected, "there is no topic left for talks on the Berlin question by the former occupying powers."

DECEMBER 1—Khrushchev, in a note to Macmillan, repeats the Soviet intention to end occupation of East Berlin by May 27, 1959.

DECEMBER 8—East German Premier Grotewohl says that all of Berlin belongs to East Germany and eventually will be controlled by it.

DECEMBER 11—Khrushchev warns that any attempt to force an entry to an isolated Berlin "means war."

DECEMBER 13—Soviet notes to NATO powers renew the demand for making West Berlin a "free city."

DECEMBER 19—The Soviet military commander in East Germany warns that Russian and East German forces are "prepared to give a devastating answer" to any violation of East German territory.

DECEMBER 25—Gromyko says that an incident in Berlin could lead to a "big war" which would hit "the American continent too."

DECEMBER 25—Soviet General Staff Chief, Marshal Sokolovsky, says that if war comes the USSR would have "intercontinental rockets, and no oceans will save the US from retaliation."

JANUARY 5, 1959—Mikoyan expresses Soviet willingness to discuss proposals for UN supervision of a "free Berlin."

JANUARY 10—A Soviet note rejects four-power talks on German reunification on the grounds that unity is now "an internal German problem."

JANUARY 27—Khrushchev says the USSR has an international missile arsenal that insures Soviet military dominance over the West.

JANUARY 29—Gromyko warns that "if no agreement is found" on Berlin, the Soviet Union will "exercise the planned measures that are already well known."

FEBRUARY 18—Khrushchev tells the Western powers not to try and force their way through East Germany to Berlin because "this will mean the beginning of war."

FEBRUARY 24—Khrushchev rejects proposals for a foreign ministers conference on the German question, calls for Summit talks and renews the warning that any violation of East German territory would be the "beginning of war."

(See next page)

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MARCH 1—Communist China's Defense Minister, Marshal Peng Teh-huai, promises China will give East Germans "all-out support" in the event of attack.

MARCH 2—The Soviet Government accepts the idea of a foreign ministers' conference.

MARCH 7—Khrushchev says Russia will "never allow" the "workers' state" in East Germany "to be liquidated by capitalism through unification," and that "reunification would be unrealistic today."

MARCH 11—Khrushchev repeats his desire for guarantees for "the independence of the free city of West Berlin and non-intervention in its internal affairs."

MARCH 19—Khrushchev says that if Soviet proposals are turned down, the USSR will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany; Western rights to occupy West Berlin would "automatically end because East Germany then would be a sovereign state and West Berlin is inside its territory."

MARCH 29—The Soviet Government asks for a non-aggression treaty pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, reduction of foreign troops in Europe, and the banning of nuclear weapons tests.

us." (Italics added.) By 1956 he was talking about "local aggressions, so-called 'nibblings,' not initially involving the most potent weapons," which must be dealt with "without our action producing a general nuclear war." But the qualifications did not modify the impact of the new strategy upon our defense programs after the Eisenhower Administration took its "new look" in 1953. Indeed, the primary consequence of that reappraisal was the eventual dissipation of the US ground forces built up during the Korean War, with resulting ever-heavier reliance on the assumed perfection of nuclear deterrence, upon which defense funds were henceforth to be lavished. Meanwhile, our European allies, following our example, abandoned their agreed plan to provide a more adequate conventional defense of Western Europe, and this led to the commitment of NATO forces, as early as December, 1954, to the use of nuclear weapons.

It can be said for "massive retaliation" that it was based upon a realistic appraisal of the military situation existing when the new strategy was announced, for that was the moment of SAC's unquestioned ascendancy. But against the new strategy it must be said that it was improvident. The Russians too had H-bombs by 1954; it was only a question of time before they would have the means to deliver them. In fact, by 1956 the Russians had developed a long-range jet bomber force which, however inferior to SAC in total capacity for destruction, had ended forever the relative invulnerability of the North American continent to military attack. And by 1958 they had added ballistic missiles, with hundreds or even thousands of missiles of intermediate range in position to rain nuclear destruction upon our European allies, while a force of missiles of intercontinental range for use against the US by itself was just over the horizon of time. At least by 1956, probably earlier, the prospect of World War III had become the prospect of a full-blown nuclear war, with neither side enjoying a decisive advantage in the capacity to employ nuclear weapons, and neither immune to their destructiveness.

As nearly as can be determined from opinion polls, letters to the editor, and like sources, the popular attitude toward a future great nuclear war is a compound of fatalism and utopian optimism. If such a war does occur, in this popular view, it will mean the end of the major belligerents and their allies, possibly of civilization itself. But such a war is not going to occur!—because no great power would be foolish enough to start it. This "common sense" view is by no means confined to the man in the street. It has been the official view since the Soviet Union began to emerge as a formidable nuclear power. Unless this is very clear in our thinking, it is impossible to understand how a national strategy justified originally by the fact that we could administer nuclear punishment to our enemies with virtual impunity, could have survived rising Soviet nuclear power.

To explore this curious development, we must ask what, precisely, is meant by the term "deterrence." Literally, anything that tends to prevent action by fear of the consequences is a "deterrent." The threatened penalties of the criminal law, for example, constitute deterrence of crime, or at least so society hopes. But in the military use of the term (as in the legal) a double confusion arises: First, at what is "deterrence" aimed? Is it aimed at any and all employment of military force by anyone anywhere? Is it aimed at any military attack across the borders of our allies? Or is it aimed at only one specific kind, or even specific instance, of the open employment of military force? Second, is a policy a "deterrent" because *it is meant to deter*, or only *when it actually does deter*? If we mean the former, of course, a deterrent can be more or less effective, and the failure of a deterrent is not a contradiction in terms. If it is the latter, then there are no possible degrees of deterrence, and it is nonsense to speak of deterrence failing.

If we use the term broadly, as the critics of massive retaliation usually do, "deterrence" characterizes any military preparedness, which always has some tendency to discourage an attack. Thus, when we describe our national military policy as "a policy of deterrence," if we mean to use the word in this broad sense, we are saying no more than that we hope our defense efforts will preserve our interests without our actually having to fight for them. "Deterrence" then is practically interchangeable with "defense."

In contrast with this broader view, the official view of

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deterrence tends to restrict the concept to certain specific threats of attack, and then to count upon it for perfect effectiveness. Thus deterrence is likely to be contrasted with defense, to the discredit of the latter because defense suggests the possibility of actual war. This tends to justify anything said or done in the name of deterrence, and to disparage local defense preparations because such preparations seem to represent our willingness to *fight,* thus undermining our determination to *deter.*

While the critics of our national deterrence policy have been developing the broader view of deterrence, examining its limits and advocating policies designed to maximize its effects without asking too much of it, the official proponents of the policy, adopting the common-sense view regarding nuclear war, have followed another course.

When the Russians began to develop nuclear weapons and the planes and missiles with which to deliver them against us, official strategists could no longer claim that we could prevent aggression surely, cheaply, and with little or no risk to ourselves merely by threatening nuclear punishment. They could and did claim, however, that *we could prevent aggression in every case in which we succeeded in raising the issue to the level at which the consequences of aggression would be a great nuclear war.* The President has said: "There is no alternative to peace." He meant that if there is no alternative to peace but total nuclear war rational men everywhere — and specifically in the Kremlin—must choose peace. Thus the Administration has evolved a list of "aggressions" that must result in total nuclear war, and for which as a consequence deterrence is both appropriate *and unfailing.* These cases are: first, a direct intercontinental attack upon the United States; second, a "major" assault upon our allies in NATO and upon Japan; third, any aggressive act anywhere that brings Russian or Chinese Communist troops into conflict with US forces. Sometimes a fourth case is added: any act of aggression in which the Communist powers employ nuclear weapons.

This list obviously does not include all possible Communist threats. General Norstad has said that there can be minor assaults even on the NATO front. There can also be aggressions carried out by satellite forces as agents of the major Communist powers. There can be all kinds of "indirect" aggression, from political intimidation to inspired civil wars. *None of these is a legitimate object of deterrence in the sense in which deterrence is aimed at the three or four cases on the list.* They are local "incidents," to be met by local defense forces. To stiffen local resistance, we may offer US support to the local government with our conventional military forces. These forces, which we sustain with the leavings from the budgetary table, are not meant to fight "real" wars. But they will serve to prove our concern—our fortitude. They may even be used to "put out brushfires," that is, actually to fight strictly local actions we do not expect to be prolonged or costly, and which we do not choose to treat as occasions for deterrence.

Why the Administration has so stubbornly resisted modifications of the "massive retaliation" policy as its very foundation has been eroded away by growing Soviet nuclear power, must be accounted something of a mystery. Fiscal conservatism is not an altogether satisfactory explanation. Nor can we doubt the President's sincere devotion to the national interest. It is only when we look at the record of what has been said in *justification for the defense programs themselves* that we begin to get at the heart of the matter. We recall Admiral Radford's transparent conviction, expressed soon after he became President Eisenhower's first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that nuclear weapons are here to stay, that because they are here they will be used in any war between powers that possess them, and that such a war probably cannot be limited. The way out, then, is obvious: *if* the threat of a nuclear holocaust can be used to prevent the other side from resorting to war at all, we must adopt that threat because it is our only hope. "Don't let's talk about limited war," Radford once told a Congressional committee in effect, "because limited war means war." Charles R. Wilson, Eisenhower's first Secretary of Defense and an apt Radford pupil, put it another way: "There isn't going to be any little war between the Americans and the Russians. If there ever is a war between the Americans and the Russians it will be a very terrible thing." And John Foster Dulles, the most thoughtful of the official strategists and probably the one who first recognized the merit in the arguments of the "limited war" critics, said in an article published in October, 1957, that "a general war between the great military powers could destroy almost all human life, certainly in the northern latitudes," and found the answer to this terrible risk in a policy of nuclear deterrence that might prevent war altogether.

It is true that the leitmotiv of economy recurs throughout: Strategic nuclear power is not only essential to deter aggression and prevent a hopeless war, but it is also cheaper. If we are to maintain tactical forces at all—and it is usually conceded that we are—then they too must be nuclear forces, because "our atomic weapons capability" will give us "more powerful deterrents with smaller forces," as Radford said in 1956.

Yet one arises from the examination of the record convinced that the explanation we are seeking really lies in military rather than in budget-balancing considerations. The President and his principal advisors have developed their theory of deterrence, with "massive retaliation" as its prime manifestation, because they really believe in its premises. Nor can the critics of "massive retaliation" simply dismiss it as nonsense. They must examine it logically, with the purpose of isolating it clearly from the alternatives they prefer. And then they

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must examine its performance and its promise in the light of experience, as will be done later in this critique. When they do so, it will be seen that *the touchstone of the threat of nuclear retaliation upon which official policy depends for its deterrent effect is the credibility of that threat.*

FIVE years ago, in an essay that is a classic of its kind, W. W. Kaufmann (then at Princeton, now with the RAND Corporation) spelled out the difficulty of establishing the credibility of the threat of nuclear retaliation. "The enemy," he wrote, "must be persuaded that we have the capability to act; that, in acting, we could inflict costs greater than the advantages to be won from attaining the objective; and that we really would act as specified in the stated contingency." Of these, persuading a potential aggressor that we *would* act is clearly the most difficult.

Kaufmann suggested that "an intelligent opponent" will judge our intentions by information obtained from three sources: our past record of performance in comparable circumstances; the statements and behavior of our government; and the attitudes of public opinion, both domestic and allied. Examining the record prior to November, 1954, the date of his essay, he found it "not unimpressive," but also not conclusive. On the critical issue of public attitudes, he noted that to lend credibility to our deterrent threat "its potential costs must seem worth incurring." He concluded that "a policy of deterrence which does not fulfill this requirement is likely to result in deterring the deterrer." In other words, it was a critical weakness of the policy of deterrence that, in order to make sure that the threatened punishment would be more than the aggressor's objective was worth to him, it tended also to make the risks of administering the punishment more than the issue was worth to us!

The five years since Kaufmann wrote his essay have not seen his conclusions reversed. There has, indeed, been explicit though reluctant official recognition of the point he most desired to emphasize, namely, the futility of applying "massive retaliation" in all circumstances. The "limited war" school of critics may thus be said to have made their principal case, and the Administration no longer pretends that SAC alone can "defend" our minor allies in Asia. Nevertheless, because of the concentration of defense expenditures upon the forces appropriate only to a great nuclear war, under a budget ceiling which ensures that less and less will remain to support the forces appropriate to local deterrence and limited war, our reliance upon the deterrent efficacy of our strategic forces has continued to grow.

Since December, 1954, when the NATO commands were told they might assume that nuclear weapons would be used from the beginning of a Russian attack, the implications of this growing reliance upon SAC for deterrence in the critical Western European area have been somewhat obscured. The publicity given the nuclear armament of NATO local defense forces permitted the impression to get abroad that, as advocated by Henry A. Kissinger, Western Europe was being prepared to defend itself against the Russian hordes in such a way that the United States might not need to come under attack. "Tactical" nuclear weapons in Europe were supposed to overcome the numerical superiority of Communist conventional ground forces, and thus make such a local defense possible.

Actually, the apparent change was a fiction. NATO's defense forces have not been prepared for local nuclear war, because this would require a vast reshuffling and multiplication of their support facilities, the cost of which would make nonsense of the Administration's claim that armament with nuclear weapons saves money. NATO's forces have indeed been supplied with tactical nuclear weapons, as they had to be in view of the certainty that the Russian forces would eventually have them to use. But it is questionable whether the addition of nuclear weapons has measurably increased whatever deterrent effect NATO's local defenses may be expected to have upon the Communists. If it is true, as Kaufmann asserted and as seems to be reasonable, that the credibility of a deterrent force depends upon *evident willingness to employ it in actual conflict,* the utter lack of enthusiasm with which our European allies have greeted the possibility of nuclear destruction limited to Western Europe or any other kind of nuclear war seems unlikely to have increased Russian respect for NATO's defenses.

The proponents of the official deterrence policy will promptly object that there was never any intention of relying upon local defenses in Western Europe to deter aggression. Western Europe, including West Berlin, is vital to our interests, they will say, and is consequently one of the cases for which massive retaliation, and if need be thermonuclear suicide is considered appropriate (remembering, of course, that if we can convince the Russians we are prepared to take the plunge, *ipso facto*, we shall be spared taking it). This must be what the President meant when he said on March 11, 1959, that "we are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe," and why he observed at the same time that a nuclear war "cannot free anything." He was simply warning the Russians that the only kind of war we could consider fighting over Berlin was one from which they could gain nothing except utter destruction. There appear to be two major difficulties with this pose, which we are expected to maintain with such stoic firmness. The first touches the very basis of the strategy of deterrence, because it concerns the truth of the commonsense view of nuclear war. The second remains even if the first is remedied, because it suggests that though the ultimate resolve to engage in total nuclear war may be a *necessary* condition of effective deterrence on issues vital to our security it is not *sufficient* to stand alone.

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The commonsense view of nuclear war, as noted earlier, takes for granted the existence of a state of effective parity in nuclear destructive power between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is assumed that either can, and indeed will, destroy the other with the forces remaining to it even after a surprise attack by the other. But if the Russians could be sure of destroying, say, 90 percent of SAC in an ICBM surprise attack, while blanketing our overseas SAC bases and NATO's airpower with ICBM's, they could also be rationally justified in assuming that they would survive a counter-attack that might be delivered by any of the surviving SAC bombers that managed to penetrate their defenses.

Given Russian ICBM accuracy no better than our engineers consider reasonable for our own missiles, it is possible to calculate the number of ICBM's the USSR must have available before an attack of this kind could seem attractive. The results of the calculations vary, because of different assumptions regarding the accuracy and reliability of Russian missiles, but they indicate that a force of 250 to 600 Soviet missiles would probably suffice against the 40-odd SAC bases in their present state of unreadiness for such an attack. According to some pessimistic estimates, the Russians could approach even the larger of these two figures by the end of next year, possibly earlier. More conservative estimates credit them with having at least the smaller of the two numbers—250—sometime in 1960.

We do not know, of course, what the Russians are actually producing, nor what they plan to produce. But the range of the estimates (*i.e.*, 250-600 during 1960) appears to represent accurately enough what the Russians must be assumed capable of doing, and therefore what it is that we ought to be prepared for. Even if the Russians are bluffing today when they threaten to use their missiles over Berlin (as the Administration seems convinced they are), in a year or two they may not have to bluff. *Meantime, the mere fact that the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent can be questioned threatens to undermine it.* The credibility of a deterrent, as Kaufmann noted, must depend heavily upon the confidence the people it is supposed to protect have in it. Quite apart from the actual vulnerability of our SAC bases to missile attack, it may be questioned whether public confidence in SAC will long survive popular belief that the Russians have achieved a decided lead in ICBM's. The President's pleas for firmness may see us through this particular Berlin crisis. But the future omens are not favorable if the present official mood of calm to the point of complacency permits the Russians in a year or two to convince the world they are leading us into the missile age by the nose.

Turning now to the second of the two difficulties noted in the President's pose of deterrent firmness, we may ask whether the strategic deterrent is *all* we need, even if we can rely on it for what it is worth.

The policy of deterrence, as applied to threats against positions we regard as vital to our security, insists that these threats are directed at objectives that are *indivisible.* West Berlin is Germany, Germany is NATO, and NATO is our place in the sun. It is true that if it were possible to prevent the Russians from fragmenting this objective, and thereby contriving to direct their immediate threat against only a small part of the whole, the effect would be to enhance the deterrent effect of our policy. But it is not possible. The Secretary of State himself has conceded that we might permit the East German authorities to take over from the Russians the surveillance of our military shipments to West Berlin—provided they did so as "agents" of Russian occupation authority. There has also been discussion regarding the precise point in the expected East German squeeze on West Berlin at which we should be justified in resorting to force. When the discussion then proceeds to consider what military action we ought actually to take, the fragmentation has been accepted. For if the only military action conceivable were to order SAC into war, there would be no point in discussing this question.

THERE are various ways of explaining why the official position is at odds with reality. Perhaps one observation will suffice: it is the absurd disproportion between the action we have threatened to take in the hope that our threat will deter the other side, and the consequences of not taking that action, but of resorting to alternative actions if the deterrent fails—short of the last possible ditch. The initiation of a thermonuclear war would so utterly and completely change the situation that the world a month later would be totally unlike the world at the moment of decision, and the problems of that moment would have become irrelevant. It is true that if the President did not make the decision he wanted the Russians to believe he would make, the consequences would be serious indeed. But not making the decision to unleash SAC would at least leave other decisions to be made.

It is important to remember that our objective is not to destroy Russia, risking the destruction of the US in the process. The objective is to *deter* the Russians from taking an action that will diminish our security—without bringing on World War III. It is the familiar problem of establishing the credibility of our deterrent. Ultimately, if all else fails, it may be necessary to go the whole way. But that would be the utter failure of deterrence, not its vindication.

In his article next week, Mr. King will continue the discussion of our defense policies by applying the general considerations explored in this introductory article to the question of strategic and local forces required for successful deterrence.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Novels and the News

by Delmore Schwartz

DURING the past generation, literary essays and critical comments announcing the imminent death of the novel have appeared with increasing frequency. The obsolescence of the novel is, in literary circles, as perennial a subject as the weather among most human beings. The very fact that the subject recurs so often should be sufficient to indicate that there is something wrong, something misleading and deceptive about the pronouncements. Surely any thing which has been overtaken by death so often is immortal and has never suffered death at all. It is like the phoenix of the literary and mythological imagination. But the death of the phoenix is inseparable from its resurrection. In direct contrast, it is difficult to think of an instance in which a critic declared that the novel had been reborn, or that it had survived a severe illness. In fact, it is characteristic of most statements of the decline of the novel that all prior statements of the same nature are ignored, and almost as often the imminence of mortality is set down in a tone which suggests relief rather than sorrow.

Yet the very terms which have been used to express the novel's state of decline or impending death suggest that the critic is moved by matters which concerned him more profoundly than the art of the novel. Seldom, if ever, does the critic speak of the death of *fiction*—or, to emphasize the self-deceptive trick of formulation further—the critic never says that the telling of *stories* has come to an end; nor does he say that the human imagination will soon cease inventing imaginary situations and events. Fiction, story-telling, and imagination are terms which are naturally avoided, since the end of story-telling is inconceivable, apart from the annihilation of mankind. Human beings are seldom with one another for more than a few minutes, at the most, without telling stories about what has been happening. This inclination is obviously so universal and so constant that a human being who remains silent under ordinary circumstances is regarded as a remarkable eccentric, even when, like Calvin Coolidge, he is the President of the United States.

It is true, as Gertrude Stein told Hemingway, that remarks are not literature; if they were, there would be more good and many more bad novelists: her statement clearly implies that anecdotes are not novels, and that a love of conversation is not in itself a love of literature. The pessimistic critics of the novel are often well-informed and sophisticated readers who point out the variety of evidence which justifies their negative predictions. They point out, for example, that a literary genre, however popular, does sometimes vanish: the short and brilliant life of the poetic drama during the Elizabethan and Jacobean period is a powerful instance, since all subsequent efforts to revive the poetic drama, despite the excellence of isolated plays in verse by first-rate poets, have failed. At first glance, this example may be quite impressive. It is entirely unconvincing, however, because the drama or any art which depends upon the theatre and upon performance is invariably as precarious as it is popular: it requires so much collaboration upon the part of so many different people: there are so many interests, risks, and contingencies involved in the theatre and all the performing arts that any production is at the mercy of uncontrollable factors; the mood and taste of the public at one extreme, and pure accident or good luck at the other.

The art of the novel does not depend at all upon many external agents and it does not need so much collaboration in order to exist, and perhaps this is one reason that modern American fiction has always existed on a level far superior to modern American drama: if there were nothing else involved, the fact, simple, coarse and crass, that it costs far less to publish a novel than to produce a play would be enough to cause the difference between the novel and the drama.

The negative evidence that the novel as a literary structure is, as Louis MacNeice wrote, "stale and plethoric," includes a good deal more which is relevant to the novel itself. Thus it is said, and it will be said time and again that it is the realistic novel of the past 150 years which has exhausted its possibilities and which cannot be renewed as a major form of literature. Hence the argument that the novel has a rich and indeed boundless future based upon the permanent desire for conversation, story-telling, and the inventions of the imagination cuts both ways.

THE sanguine critic may point out how deeply-rooted fiction is in daily experience, in fish stories and tall tales of conversation, in revery, day dream and dreams at night: any comprehensive characterization of fiction would have to recognize the fantasies which occur during sleep and the revery of waking consciousness as a primitive kind of fiction common to all human beings. The pessimistic critic can use this fact as negative evidence, pointing out how during recent generations more and more important novelists have tried to go beyond the ordinary limits of the novel as a literary structure and as "a slice of life." Joyce, Mann, Proust, Kafka and Virginia Woolf, all, in one or another way, introduce material and use devices which the realistic novel as such seemed to exclude. They draw upon fantasy, stream of consciousness, nightmare, hallucination and above all they make uses of the methods of poetry and depend upon the power of style to an extent which indicates how inadequate they found the traditional realistic novel as a structure.

Thus Mann often uses the essay as a form in his novels, and in *Dr. Faustus* he uses the biography as the structure of his novel; Joyce's extreme modifications of ordinary language in *Finnegans Wake* and the fact that Proust's great novel uses the structure of the autobiographical essay and memoir are but two among many examples which might very well be cited to demonstrate that it is precisely the depths of the imagination, the complexity of human experience, in the middle of the 20th Century, which makes it impossible to sup-

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pose that the novel will flourish in the future as it has during the past 150 years and continue to be the most comprehensive and popular form of literature. So the argument goes.

THE best answer and the best basis for a belief in the richness of the future of the novel is suggested by the origins of the very word, novel, which derive from *nouvelle* and *novella,* the French and Italian words for news. The novel from the very start—or at whatever starting-point we choose—has always, whatever its other traits, been characterized by a direct relationship to the news, to what is new, to new experiences of mankind. There is always something new under the sun: this assumption, whether or not it is explicit, has always united the novelist and the reader of novels. And it is this direct relationship to recent history and to the news which explains the comparative eclipse of the novel during the past decade. Recent history and the news have been so spectacular that only the writer of science fiction appears to be able to keep from being out-moded as the bow and arrow. This is the reason too for the greatly increased popularity of books about recent history whether they take the form of memoirs or of biography. The novelist has had to compete with the sensational reality of the Second World War, the atomic bomb, and worldwide revolution: he has also had to compete with the almost equally sensational and dramatic events which appear in the daily newspapers. In the past, the resources for securing the latest news about reality did not include the press, radio, and TV, to say almost nothing of the fact that events were not as continuously and increasingly spectacular and astonishing as they have come to be during the past twenty years.

The writer of fiction has always, as a matter of instinct, attempted to compete with the reality of the news and the news of reality—Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* is perhaps the most familiar example—and this instinct can be seen at work in those who write the fictional scenarios for TV. An overwhelming number of TV plays tend, week by week, to use as their subject-matter the headlines in the newspapers of two or three weeks before: a murder, a kidnapping, an outbreak of juvenile delinquency or the uncovering of drug addiction will invariably inspire the fiction writers of TV within the weeks immediately following.

This and other related facts may seem to indicate even more strongly that the future of the novel has become more limited and restricted, that its possibilities of development have indeed declined. The contrary is true, insofar as one can speak with assurance about anything in the future. However spectacular the news may be, however interesting the first-hand account of a historical event, however fascinating the attractions on the TV screen, however quick and comprehensive the news about the present which the newspaper makes available, there is no substitute for the particular ways in which the reader of novels encounters experience, or for particular satisfactions which only the art of the novel makes possible. The very nature of fiction makes it possible to enter a complete world of reality as if one lived in it oneself: it makes it possible to grasp experience from the *inside*, looking out, by means of the immediate and natural identification with characters and experiences which occurs the moment one finds a novel "interesting." The reader inhabits the interior of another being in a way which no other art makes possible.

This is of course the reason that fiction is so often merely a form of vicarious experience and what is more important it is the reason for the degree of hypnotic absorption which the reading of a novel provides. It is precisely because the reading of a novel gratifies a primary human need and provides a unique and invaluable experience of reality that its future possibilities have continually increased, along with the possibilities of human experience. It is worth bearing in mind that *Don Quixote*, one of the first and perhaps the greatest of novels, took as its starting part the foolishness and the foibles of a human being who was a devout reader of fiction. An obsessed reader of one kind of fiction, the chivalric romance which was no longer fashionable and had come to be regarded as ridiculous. Thus at the very birth or beginning of the history of the novel, a great work of fiction announced the impending death of another genre of fiction, once in vogue, mocking the declining genre and expressing satirical delight in its passing.

A Curse

IF I forget thee not, New York,
May my ulcer of exile fork
Your sons, may impetigo and the yaws
Be on sale in all the stores;
May you like Chicagoans pronounce your r's,
May the handles fall from your doors
If I forget thee not; may your zippers stick
And drains plug, may you always eat at Nedicks;
May adultery be your only sweet,
No stain ever wash from a sheet;
May the theatres play one movie forever,
May the telephone ring never;
May the laundries take the buttons from your shirts
And the elastic rot on your skirts
If I forget thee not; may your letters be unsent,
May your Sunday dinners never end;
May the corks fall into the wine
And your fish be all scales or all spine;
May oil be found in Central Park,
May there be no place for cars to park;
May the ocean run from your taps
And Jersey come to sit in your laps;
May slugs jam every turnstile slot
If I forget thee not.

IRVING FELDMAN

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Barbara Ward's World

by Daniel M. Friedenberg

LADY JACKSON, known to the world as Barbara Ward, delivered a series of lectures at the University of Ghana in 1957. On the recommendation of Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who contributed the foreword, they have been published under the title *Five Ideas That Change the World*. The ideas discussed are nationalism, industrialism, colonialism, Communism and internationalism.

Five Ideas That Change the World,
by Barbara Ward
(Norton; $3.75).

Miss Ward is a superb product of 19th Century European liberalism, a person of democratic and Christian conviction. But since the world is being shaped by far different forces, an air of unreality hangs thick over her words, an aristocratic air best described by Bertrand Russell in his portrait of his grandfather, a Prime Minister under Queen Victoria:

> There was to be democracy, but it was assumed that the people would always be ready to follow the advice of wise and experienced aristocrats. There was to be a disappearance of imperialism, but the subject races in Asia and Africa, whom the British would voluntarily cease to govern, would have learned the advantage of a bicameral legislature composed of Whigs and Tories in about equal numbers, and would reproduce in torrid zones the parliamentary duels of Disraeli and Gladstone . . .

Chapter by chapter we are led into an analysis of ideas so phrased that they prove the author's values. Nationalism, which she defines as the "nodal point of all problems," is the key idea influencing our time, for the real center of power in the world today is the State. Nationalism is shown developing through the French, English and Spanish. Asian despotism is contrasted to the seminal idea of freedom created by the Greeks. Apparently nationalism as it developed among Chinese, Russians, Arabs, was a peripheral phenomenon.

The chapter dealing with Colonialism is particularly *Alice in Wonderland*. Miss Ward describes the benefits accorded to the Indians through "beneficent imperialism." After writing of law and order, she concludes that the British introduced the "most precious human good . . . freedom" into India for the first time. This is close to the Hegelian definition of freedom as doing what one must. The reviewer happened to be traveling through India during the last days of British rule. Occupying a second-class carriage, he was engaged in conversation with a high caste Indian when a British security officer entered. The officer, without bothering to look at the Hindu, asked the reviewer to come up to the first-class carriage "where he would be with his own kind" and was surprised at the refusal. For several moments the Hindu was silent after the Englishman left. Then he said in a voice throbbing with emotion: "Now you can see why we hate them so."

The legacy of colonialism is hate, hatred of the white man and his assumed superiority, which is quite the reverse of freedom, no matter how "beneficent" in its railways, roads and harbors to bring out low-cost raw materials. Miss Ward might make such naïve statements in Ghana, where the mosquito kept out the white man, but could she say the same in Kenya or Nyasaland without the natives laughing—or stoning—her off stage?

Examples of this unreality abound and seem to have their root in a refusal to see the economic interest underlying attitudes. She suggests that because Britain's Asian dominions, excepting Burma, stayed in the Commonwealth, it is proof that "in the balance more weal than ill came from the colonial years"—whereas the simpler truth is that these new nations stayed in the Commonwealth because they had built up a trade credit during World War II and did not care to have it cancelled. It is the advantages of the sterling area, not love of Englishmen, that keep the remnants of non-white Empire together. We also learn that the Congo gained greatly from "law and order" (her phrase) and that French and Belgian loans indicate "a

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new sense of responsibility for colonial peoples." There is nothing wrong with capital expenditure for long-term returns, but to define it as Barbara Ward does almost enters the realm of fantasy.

She rightfully points out that capitalism has changed greatly since Marx observed the dreadful English working conditions in the 1840s. But Miss Ward seems unaware that this change has only taken place in certain Western European and American nations, that the conditions Marx referred to still exist even in parts of Western Europe: in Spain, Portugal, southern Italy, not to mention a wide range of backward areas. For the poor in these countries the Marxist theory offers a way out. We, the middle-class intellectuals of Western society, know that the dialectic does not by mystical process lead to a higher synthesis, that the theory of surplus-value is absurd, that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" does not automatically wither away, that the poor do not become progressively more miserable in our modified capitalist society: but what does all this ratiocination mean to a starving Bolivian Indian, a Negro automatically jailed once a year in South Africa, a landless Arab who will shout one day for Nasser and the next for Kassem? To say that these people are blind to the facts is to ignore the greater fact of human hope. What little of capitalism the masses throughout the world have seen is in the form of landlords and usury; and most democracy in backward areas has been an alternate spoils system for the rich divorced from social service.

Surely those who profess democratic sentiments will agree with the author that Communism's greatest weakness is that it enshrines despotic authority in a world yearning for free government. But that does not automatically make one a champion of the "free world" as understood by John Foster Dulles. The truth that Barbara Ward evades—and it is noteworthy that in a lecture in Ghana she avoids reference to Algeria—is that many peoples of the world may choose authoritarian rule with a hope of future liberation rather than the Franco, Trujillo, Rhee, Hussein potpourri, or the Guatemalan, South African, Kenyan, or South Vietnam "free world."

I cannot argue with Miss Ward's final conclusion, that "the Communist Powers need to abandon their picture of world order and the Western Powers need to acquire one." The only question is what type of acquisition. The answer of the author can be seen in an article recently published in *The New York Times*. The formula "of future greatness" she states is "a genuine religious revival, possibly of a new oriental Christianity" based on the great urban centers of the East. This is her hope. But the one idea of real meaning—her deep sense of society being an expression of religious truth—is not discussed as one of the five ideas shaping the world. And here we find the final paradox and explanation of the book.

Miss Ward's basic mistake is that though she includes industrialism as one of the levers of the modern world, she does not think in terms of social change made necessary and inevitable by technology. What we call "the century of the common man" means the possibility of industrial society to raise the mass standard of living which, in its ultimate reality, is an index of its tools. Slavery was permitted and practiced by Christian society, though against its ethic, and only could effectively be abolished when tools became more efficient than slave labor. It is not "social justice, humane concern, and Christian compassion" which is molding modern society, but the simple fact that equality among men is only possible when their talents are required to tend complex machinery on which they are all equally dependent. The need for skilled labor—the obsolescence of unskilled labor—is shaping a world revolution because skilled labor needs to be well-housed, well-fed and well-educated before it can practice its skill.

Men have clung to the ideal of political democracy because it represented the best hope of a rising standard of living and, only secondarily, liberty. By tradition we associate despotism with men like Hitler, democracy with countries like the United States, but this is not an ultimate law of history. In the collapse of the closed feudal order and the rise of the Renaissance, despots like Lorenzo the Magnificent of Florence were liberating forces while, as an illustration to the contrary, democrats like Cleon of Athens during the Peloponnesian War, advocated butchery. Communism, though anti-moral in our tradition, is a total response to the challenge of technology in a backward society. If the standard of living be the ultimate criterion of desirability for modern man, and if a rigid tyranny could raise consumption of consumer goods beyond that of democracies, woe be to the latter.

Miss Ward is, of course, too intelligent to ignore the reality that "the free world" is a negation when defined merely as the anti-Communist world. Her final proposal is that the West should transfer one or two percent of its national income, an annual sum of $5 to $10 billion, to the poorer nations. She believes this is possible. "My faith is that the shaping forces of social justice, humane concern, and Christian compassion, which Marx dismissed as worthless bourgeois windowdressing, represent on the contrary the essential expression of the free spirit." We shall see, we shall see.

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

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DOUBLEDAY

MOVIES

Angry Man on the Make

IN the plentiful comment about the Beat Generation and Britain's Angries, one point has generally been overlooked. So far, only the British group has produced works of more than passing or clinical interest to non-members of the set. Prominent among these works is John Braine's vivid novel, *Room at the Top*. It has now been blessed with

Room at the Top
(Continental)

a film incarnation which is, in my view, better than the original.

It is the story of young Joe Lampton, an ex-RAF sergeant, who leaves his stifling Midlands home to take a job in the Town Hall of a larger town and who is determined to make his way. He is good at his work, as accountant, but his chief asset is sexual. He cold-bloodedly sets out to woo the daughter of a local tycoon and eventually wins her. En route to the top, he becames involved with an older woman, married, who falls in love with him and for whose death he is morally responsible.

From one viewpoint it is, like *An American Tragedy*, a story of class and economic conflict focussed under the glass of sexual encounter. From another viewpoint it is a story of the futility of complete reliance on conscious planning in human affairs without making allowance for the mines and time-bombs of the unconscious.

Neil Patterson's screenplay, praised by Braine, has strengthened the story line by rearrangement, excision and development and has—in the case of the rich girl, for one— improved the characterization. This is, in fact, that phenomenon in films: a script that makes its drama out of the development and counterpoint of character. The plot is secondary. Life is propagated on the screen and, as always, that in itself is automatically fascinating. In a play or film, only dramatic insight and skill can propagate life; but once the characters breathe, they are interesting if they simply pursue their ingrained desires, without clever plot twists and surprises. (Witness Turgenev and Chekhov.)

I suppose I must note that the dialogue in this film is much more frank than usual. I do this reluctantly, for fear of false emphasis. The people speak as we feel they should—as they speak in the book or in any serious contemporary novel. It is a disgrace that other films are bowdlerized, not a triumph that this one is lifelike.

The director is Jack Clayton, whose only previous picture was an excessively arty short, *The Bespoke Overcoat*. But Clayton's years as an assistant director have borne remarkable fruit; this work is not a promise, it is an achievement. His use of the camera, his eye for evocative locations, his ear (even the heel clicks in the Town Hall corridors contribute something), all these are extraordinary and create intensity and texture. Even more extraordinary is the way he has made the very tempo of the film match the stages of the story. For a while the pace is swift, restless, impatient, as Joe arrives and scouts the territory. Then as the relationships form and deepen, the tempo gradually broadens — the way compulsive conversation with a stranger evolves into easy, relaxed conversation with a friend.

ALL these accomplishments one might expect from a talented film man who has learned his job. The surprise is in what Clayton has achieved with actors. Those who have seen Laurence Harvey may not credit that he gives, as Joe, a performance of subtlety and color, springing from inner resources one would not have suspected in him and, in any event, would not have believed he would know how to use. Equipped with a Midland accent, Harvey fuses persuasively his feelings of revenge for centuries of peasantry behind him, for personal slights suffered, and the discovery in himself of emotional reaches that make his calculated victory hollow.

Alice, his mistress, has been made French in the film, presumably to accommodate Simone Signoret. The transformation is painless because Alice is an outsider, anyway, and because Miss Signoret is so heart-breakingly effective in the role that it is now inconceivable without her. Following her good performance in *Casque d'Or* in 1952, she

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had declined into screen-star immobility, providing only a handsome façade behind which the spectator was invited to imagine emotions. Here, however, Clayton has got from her a rich, sophisticated performance, saturated with the musk of femininity—a fatalistic sexual pilgrim's progress from attraction to passion to passionate love to death.

When Donald Wolfit last appeared in New York, the critics, in sheer ignorance, called his fine, old-fashioned style "ham." As the tycoon in this film, he demonstrates again the power of a resourceful "big" actor who has in him the electric charge of theatrical presence. Space permits the mention of only two others in an unexceptionable cast: Donald Houston, best-known for his performance in *Under Milk Wood*, who is winning as Joe's friend, and Hermione Baddeley as Alice's friend whose apartment is the lovers' trysting place. The film world needs a law forcing producers to offer first to Miss Baddeley all parts for which Hermione Gingold or Renée Houston might later be considered.

Neither as novel or picture is *Room at the Top* the best example of the Angries' quandary: that of the Red Brick University graduate struggling in a society where he is educated above his class origins and further frustrated in a small country that lacks sufficient opportunities for an increasing number of educated young men. Joe is neither "overeducated" nor democratic. He is an adventurer who yearns for power, not equality, and he has before him the example of his future father-in-law—a Yorkshireman married to a Mayfair type. *Room at the Top* is basically no more contemporary a story than *Tono-Bungay*. But as a drama of human drives and torments told with maturity and penetration, it is a rare event among English-language films.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

THEATRE

A Raisin in the Sun

IF *A Raisin in the Sun* had been written by a white instead of a colored woman and if it had been written about a white family, it would have done well to recover its investment. As it is, it has received praises from all sides and the public is flocking to see it. As a piece of dramatic writing it is old-fashioned. As something near to the conscience of a nation troubled by in-

A Raisin in the Sun
by Lorraine Hansberry
(Ethel Barrymore Theatre)

justice to Negroes, it is emotionally powerful. Much of its success is due to our sentimentality over the "Negro question."

Miss Hansberry has had the good sense to write about a Negro family with vices as well as virtues, and has spared us one of those well-scrubbed, light-skinned families who often appear in propaganda pieces about discrimination. If she avoids the over-worked formulas of the "Negro" play, however, she does not avoid those of the "domestic" play.

The day begins with the alarm clock summoning the family, who love one another deeply, to get up and start fighting. They have to struggle to make ends meet, but things are looking up because this morning the postman is going to bring a $10,000 life-insurance check, the legacy left by Mother's deceased husband. The son, who is a chauffeur, wants to invest the money in a liquor store and make a fast killing. Mother is opposed. The daughter-in-law is patient but feels she doesn't understand her husband any more. The sister is the "modern" type who thinks the rest of them are living in the dark ages. After many emotional scenes, Mother stalks out and puts a third of the money on a down payment for a house (which happens to be in a white neighborhood). The balance she gives to her son as a kind of vote of confidence, with the stipulation that part of it be used for Sister's education. Son proceeds to put it all into the hands of a faithless companion who skips town. If it weren't for the little house out there in the white neighborhood, things would be almost hopeless; but everyone summons up courage and decides to move into the new place even if the white people will make it pretty tough.

The patient wife is, of course pregnant, faints in a crisis and sneaks away to an abortionist. The Mother is a matriarch—tyrannical, though good-natured—who has, of course, made a wreck of her son's emotions. The son is big, strong, and cynical, a lion caged up with too many women. The emancipated sister is, of course, partly right and partly comic, with many speeches in bravura. The white man who comes to tell them they had better not move into the white neighborhood is, of course, a little runt of a thing carrying a brief-case. The play's set is designed, of course, to show how depressing it is living in a Southside tenement; and, of course, Mother keeps in the window a little potted plant which is a symbol of the good, green life which they all long for inside their souls.

It may have been Miss Hansberry's objective to show that the stage stereotypes will fit Negroes as well as white people, to which my own reply must be that I never doubted it. They will fit anybody. Rather, anybody can be made to fit them.

The play is moving as a theatrical experience, but the emotions it engenders are not relevant to the social and political realities. The effect it produces is comparable to that which would be had in the concert hall if a composer of today were to write a concerto in the manner of Tchaikovsky.

LUCKILY, the actors are capable of performing the score for all it is worth. Sidney Poitier brings to the role of the frustrated son all the pent-up dynamism for which his screen roles have made him famous. Diana Sands as the sister is pert, intelligent, and versatile. But the acting triumph of the occasion belongs to Claudia McNeil as the Mother. Large in body and heart, she makes the character's ignorance, dignity, and pathos entirely memorable. Her cries of anguish at the second-act curtain, when she discovers that her son has thrown away the family's money, rise to the distant corners of the theatre in a giant crescendo. From an actress of smaller spirit, letting go in such full voice could have been an embarrassment. Miss McNeil, more than equal to the demand, causes it to register with the full impact of theatrical fervor.

TOM F. DRIVER

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RECORDS

Instrumental Variety

THE six early-18th Century concertos of Manfredini that I Musici plays in its superlative fashion on Epic LC-3514, and the four by Bonporti that it plays on LC-3542, are attractive in their freshness. But the Flute Concertos Op. 10 of Vivaldi that it plays on LC-3541 are among the less interesting works of this composer—the best of the set being No. 3 (*The Goldfinch*).

Angel 45028 has similarly outstanding performances by the Virtuosi di Roma of the enjoyable Vivaldi Concerto in D (*Accademico Formato*) for oboe, violin and cello and Albinoni Concerto No. 9 for two oboes (edited by Giazotto); Bassani's lovely Canzoni Amorose (edited by Malipiero); and on the other hand Respighi's *Old Airs and Dances* Suite No. 3, one of his modernizations of old music, done with restraint and taste.

The unfamiliar trio sonatas of Ruggieri and Valentino on Haydn 9057, *Italian Baroque Music,* are of little interest; but the record has Corelli's lovely Trio Sonata Op. 4 No. 7 and the well-known Concertos Nos. 6, 8 and 11 from Vivaldi's *L'Estro Armonico,* which are three of his finest pieces. Good performances by the Chamber Orchestra of the Societas Musica of Copenhagen under Jorgen Ernst Hansen.

Handel's Organ Concertos Op. 4 Nos. 2 and 5 and Op. 7 Nos. 1 and 5, engaging minor pieces of his, are lent additional charm, on Kapp 9018, by the delightfully clear, bright, compact and cleanly defined sounds of the little Holtkamp organ in the Chapel of MIT, on which the pieces are played well by Lawrence Moe with the Unicorn Concert Orchestra under Klaus Liepmann.

Angel 45011 continues the series devoted to Boccherini's unfamiliar string quintets. Of the latest group Op. 18 No. 5 is unusual in substance and operations, as Boccherini's music often is; Op. 40 No. 2 is immediately engaging; and three single movements from other quintets are charming. Excellent performances by the Quintetto Boccherini, except for the tone of the first violin.

As for standard repertory, Beethoven's Trio Op. 97 (*Archduke*), on Angel 35704, is given a performance by the David Oistrakh Trio that is precise, smooth and placid even where the music —in the first movement, for example— is dramatically eventful.

Monitor 2002 as Bach's great Concerto in D minor, with playing of the solo part by the Russian pianist Richter that is like his playing in Schubert's Sonata Op. 42: competent and in good taste but without arresting force or distinction. Kogan's performance of Prokofiev's Violin Concerto No. 2 also is on the record.

Capitol-EMI G-7150 offers the infrequently played early Symphony K.338 of Mozart, with Allegros that are delightful in their high spirits, and an Andante characteristic in its poignant loveliness; and Haydn's No. 104, the last and one of the finest of his symphonies. Good performances by Kempe with the London Philharmonia; and sound that needs a lot of additional bass for adequate solidity.

In Salzburg once I was told that Toscanini had said: "When Bruno Walter comes to something beautiful he melts. I suffer!" Nothing more perceptive was ever said about Walter; and the tendency to melt has, in the course of time, done increasing damage to his performances of the classics. It is present in his performance of Beethoven's *Eroica* Symphony with a recording orchestra on Columbia ML-5320, making somewhat amorphous a work that should be taut.

Most of Beethoven's *Pastoral* Symphony can be played in the very leisurely tempos of Klemperer's performance with the London Philharmonia on Angel 35711. But the rustics' dance in the third movement I find unacceptably sluggish.

Angel COLH-30, in the Great Recordings of the Century series, offers an LP dubbing of Casals' famous 1937 performance of Dvorak's Cello Concerto. His magnificent playing is worth having in spite of the sound—especially that of the Czech Philharmonic under Szell—that is very gritty in the portions dubbed from the poorer of the 78-rpm sides used for the transfer, and that is made even worse when it is brightened with additional treble, as it needs to be.

Two enjoyable pieces by Rimsky-Korsakov, the *Russian Easter* Overture and the Suite from *Le Coq d'Or,* are performed well by Goossens with the London Philharmonia on Capitol-EMI G-7158.

Of the pieces by Walton that he himself performs with the Philharmonia on Angel 35639 the largely parodistic music for *Façade* that he wrote when he was twenty is still delightful; whereas the two coronation marches and the *Portsmouth Point* and Johannesburg Festival Overtures testify only to his having developed into an accomplished technician.

The excerpts from Tchaikovsky's *Nutcracker* on Capitol-EMI G-7149 comprise the pieces in the familiar *Nutcracker Suite* and a number of others, including the finest passages in the score: from Act 1, a few additional bits of the Christmas party music and the Winter Scene, which is one of Tchaikovsky's most beautiful pieces of writing; from Act 2, a few additional divertissements, the superb Pas de Deux, and the final waltz with its reprise of the wonderful introduction to the act. Sensitively phrased and beautiful-sounding performances by the Philharmonia under Kurtz, which benefit by additional bass.

B. H. HAGGIN

ERICH FROMM
Author, *Escape from Freedom*, *The Sane Society*

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Notes on Contributors

DELMORE SCHWARTZ is preparing a new book of poems. IRVING FELDMAN is on the English faculty of Kenyon College. DANIEL M. FRIEDENBERG is a New York businessman.

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

Graham Hughes ("The Sickness of the South," *NR*, March 23) is different. There is no spirit of superiority in him. He is most thoughtful and kind and patient and loving. We don't know how sick we really are, but he does and is sympathetic.

I have some information for Mr. Hughes. He has confused us with the people on London's Notting Hill. We don't have any guilt complex. The trouble with us is that we are just plain, downright mean. What we need is not psychotherapy but salvation. Our souls are black with sin and unless we mend our ways in a hurry we are headed straight for the eternal fires of Hell. If Mr. Hughes would tell us just that, it might help. To do us any good, Mr. Hughes would have to come down in person and pitch his revival tent. We have to get the message hot, with the preacher sweating and us sweating along with him when it hits us.

I have some further information for Mr. Hughes. There are some liberals even down here in the South. When they see the way the Mexicans are treated in Colorado or the Nisei in California, every "impulse is to strike out in righteous anger," and he just ought to see how worked up they can get about the way the Hungarians are treated in Hungary. Only last week I was at a meeting of good church people, and some of them got awfully worried about what is going to happen to the Aleuts and the Eskimos and the Indians in Alaska when the price of land starts going up. But when it comes to the problem here in the South, which Mr. Hughes is concerned about, no liberals anywhere have behaved with more "remarkable and admirable restraint."

Mr. Hughes wants to declare the South a "moral disaster area" and set up a "Disaster Loan Corporation" to make us some moral loans. God knows, we could use them, if the interest rate isn't too high. But, to change only slightly the questions which the sound citizens were asking 20 years ago when we spendthrift New Dealers got the federal budget up to the astronomical figure of $9 billion, "Where are all the morals coming from?" Being the sympathetic type myself, I sometimes find myself worrying more about the "liberals" than about us sinning Southerners. I wouldn't go so far as to say *they* are sick, but their color doesn't look too healthy. It couldn't be meanness like we have got, because "liberals" are the kindest people there are. Maybe they are just worn out from all the effort of restraining their righteous anger.

After a long absence, I have been back in the South for the past eight years. Sometimes, I confess, I find it difficult to put the same old rollicking gusto into my singing when the band strikes up "Dixie." In our excitement over one "tradition," we seem to be throwing a lot of other very fine ones into the discard. But I was also in Washington, D. C., during the rise of the "higher immorality" and the panicky retreat before McCarthyism (it started before McCarthy). I wonder if Mr. Hughes in his look at the South has not confused the Southern symptom with a sickness which is deep and far more widespread than the South.

CLIFFORD DURR
Montgomery, Alabama

► ***Jingoism in Reverse?***

SIRS:

MR. GETLEIN'S sweeping, sensational and ignorant indictment of an excellent exhibition, the Carnegie International, and a whole body of contemporary American painting is deplorable; I, for one, have been saddened to find such a dismal and dishonorable performance in the pages of a magazine which has traditionally welcomed all that is liveliest and most creative in contemporary thought and culture.

I have just returned from a month of travel abroad, in connection with the organization of a show of contemporary European art. Since Mr. Getlein imagines that the high reputation of the American abstract Expressionists is both undeserved and part of an insidious conspiracy engineered by Madison Avenue, *Art News* and the Museum of Modern Art, I should like to report my findings. Pollock and his related American contemporaries are profoundly admired, have become an important source of new artistic energies and hope, and have, indeed, replaced Picasso as the symbol of liberation for a new European generation of artists. This is the strongest single impression I carried away from innumerable conversations with many artists in France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Spain, artists of maturity and recognized stature, in many cases. . . . Surely, one may take pride in such a turn of events, without being accused of over-zealous patriotism, or some form of American Firstism.

Actually, I think Mr. Getlein is the "jingoist" in reverse. When you sweep the decks clear of the liveliest abstraction, all that is left are those dogged, defunct American Scene painters, trying stubbornly and even desperately to clothe yesterday's social problems in some sort of contemporary-looking form; these artists quite clearly still engage the author's sympathies and loyalties. Many rash statements about advanced art have been made over the past 50 years by intemperate, hostile critics, but I can remember nothing sillier, or further from the mark, than the identification of the new painting and Eisenhower Republicanism!

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